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3The Relative Performance of Mutual and Proprietary Life Insurance
Companies in the UK: An Exploratory Study
Abstract
After discussing the main tenets of stakeholder and agency theory, the paper provides an
exploratory empirical study of the relative performance of mutual and proprietary life
insurance companies in the UK during the period 1995-96. The mutual companies
included in the sample performed well relative to the proprietary companies in terms of
their overall financial strength, annual surpluses and investment earnings. While the
mutuals had slightly higher expense ratios than the proprietary companies, they were
relatively more cost efficient and operated with potential economies of scale. There is
also evidence that fund managers in mutuals perform at least as well on average as those
in proprietary companies.
41. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to consider the governance structures and relative
efficiency of proprietary and mutual companies in the UK life insurance industry. The
paper will present the findings of an exploratory empirical study that compares the
relative performance of the two organisational forms. While the paper is essentially
concerned with the UK life insurance industry, the results may be viewed as generic in
nature. Issues of organisational form are of importance in other financial services
industries and therefore the findings of this paper will add to the knowledge and
understanding of the relationship between organisational form and efficiency in all
financial markets.
The ownership and organisational structure of proprietary companies is different
to that of mutual companies.  Proprietary companies are owned by shareholders and are
therefore constrained by the requirement, applicable to all shareholder owned companies,
of maximising shareholder wealth. Mutual companies are owned by the fund-holders, the
customers of the company.  The debate on efficiency in the life insurance industry must
therefore be conducted in the context of an understanding of the relative stake-holdings
and ownership underpinning both types of companies.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a brief theoretical underpinning is
provided. Section 3 reviews previous comparative studies. Section 4 consists of the
exploratory empirical study of the performance of mutual and proprietary life insurers in
the UK. The paper ends with a brief conclusion in section 5.
52. Ownership and stakeholder theory
There are several variants of stakeholder theory. However, for the purposes of this
paper, a brief review of stakeholder theory as originally developed by the Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) in the early 1960s will be given.  The theory will then be applied
to the life insurance industry.
The basic stakeholder proposition, as presented by Stanford Research Institute
(SRI), is quite simply  “. . . those groups without whose support the organisation would
cease to exist” (SRI, 1963)  (Freeman, 1984).
The theory is presented diagrammatically in Figure 1.
















6Stakeholder theory does not attempt to place stakeholders in any order of
importance. However, under the Anglo-Saxon market economy model,1 sharehol rs are
perceived as of premier importance and consequently for proprietary companies
maximisation of shareholder wealth is the major aim.  However, in order to deliver
maximisation of shareholder wealth proprietary companies must maintain competitive
advantage and therefore must take customers, that is fund-holders, needs into account
which is likely to be in the form of providing a satisfactory return. In theory, proprietary
companies will maximise shareholder wealth while satisfying fund-holders.  In the case
of mutual companies customers are also members (owners) and therefore form a dual
stakeholder group. The requirements on managers are more clearly focused than for
proprietary companies: to maximise returns to fund-holders. For both proprietary
companies and mutual companies two aspects of performance are critical; the
performance of the fund manager and efficiency, that is operating the company with as
low a cost base as possible.  In both cases the efficiency of managers, the agents of the
shareholders or fund-holders, is core to the performance of the company and the next
section goes on to consider aspects of principal/agent theory.
Agency Theory
The key issue for most economists is efficiency.  Such a view is most vividly
illustrated by the fundamental economic theory of the firm, namely perfect competition.
                                                 
1 The Anglo-Saxon model refers to the version of market economics adopted by the Anglophone countries,
for example, the UK and the USA.
7 Given the assumptions of the model, firms are driven to behave in an optimal and
singular objective that can be best described as profit maximisation.  However, when
control of the firm resides in the hands of individuals who are not the owners, then the
assumption of profit maximising behaviour and subsequent efficiency has to be
addressed.
In this vein, Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the theoretical framework of
agency to pin point the efficiency costs associated with the separation of firm ownership
and control.  While these costs would appear to be significant, Fama and Jensen (1983)
made the case that separation of ownership and control also has its own organisational
enhancing efficiency characteristics through a specialisation of roles and
responsibilities.  While separating firm ownership from firm control may be efficient it
unfortunately enables management to subvert the interests and objectives of owners for
its own set of goals.  In the case of the life insurance industry, where there are both
mutual and proprietary companies, the critical issue in relation to the agency problem is
whether the degree of corporate control over the agents is greater in proprietary
companies than mutual companies due to financial market pressures exerted by
shareholders. Some researchers, including Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997),
have concluded that in order to maintain the all-important pursuit of efficiency, it is
essential to recognise that managers of firms should be directed to undertake activities
which are in the best interests of themselves as well the firm's owners, that is goal
congruence.
Agency theory purports to offer an efficient solution to this problem by
suggesting that agents should be offered incentives to work in the interest of the owners,
8or more correctly the principals.  If the agents do not act in the interests of the principals
then they will be unlikely to earn the offered incentives.  As long as the manager or agent
finds it preferable to work in pursuit of the principal's interests and receive the incentives
on offer, rather than work in pursuit of their own objectives and receive no incentives,
then the solution will be efficiency enhancing.
In consequence, observers have taken the insights of agency theory and argued
that in order to improve firm efficiency, senior mangers should be offered incentive pay.
More commonly it was believed that Chief Executive Officers, CEO should have their
remuneration linked to the firm's financial performance.  However, despite these beliefs
only weak empirical support has been found in both the US and UK (Jensen and Murphy,
1990).  The results of Jensen and Murphy (1990a) were so weak that they invoked a note
of defeat with it being argued that the “. . . results are inconsistent with the implications
of formal agency models of optimal contracting” and a suggestion that agency theory
should be integrated with other paradigms in order to explain the determination of CEO
pay.
Following Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997) it can be shown that the
agency problem to be solved can be specified in the following way:



















1       (2)
Where:
e is the agent’s effort.
9x is the outcome from the agent’s effort.
W(x) is the wage paid to the agent conditional on an outcome of x.
PH, L is the probability of the agent’s action creating a high or low outcome in x.
U is the agent’s reservation level of utility
(1) is the principal’s utility function
(2) is the participation constraint
An underlying tenet of principal-agent models is the need to maximise both the
principal and the agent’s utility whilst recognising the opposing nature of both.  In
consequence, an understanding of the optimal solution to the contractual problem can be
gained by analysing the utility functions for both the agent and the principal.
3.  Previous comparative studies of mutual and proprietary life insurance companies
There are two main ways of teting whether mutual and proprietary life insurance
companies are equally efficient in terms of their cost management and production
activities. The first is to estimate a cost or pr duction function for a sample of companies
and include a dummy variable (for example, with a value of zero for mutuals and one for
proprietary companies) as an explanatory variable in the model. The estimated coefficient
of this dummy variable can then be tested for significance and estimates of average cost
and other cost efficiency measures can be calculated for the two forms of organisation.
The second way is to estimate separate cost or production functions for mutual
companies and proprietary companies and then use some cost and error structure tests to
investigate whether one form is more efficient than the other.
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In a recent study of cost efficiency in the UK life insurance industry (see
Hardwick, 1997), an organisational form dummy variable was included among the
explanatory variables in a translog multiproduct cost frontier, estimated using data for a
sample of 54 companies over the period 1989-93. The study found that the dummy
variable did have a significant influence on total cost, and the results further suggested
that the mutual companies were more cost efficient than the proprietary companies
(although the difference was not statistically significant at the five per cent level).
In an attempt to overcome the main disadvantage of the dummy variable approach
(which only allows organisational form to affect the cost structure linearly), Gardner and
Grace (1994) estimated separate (hybrid translog) multiproduct cost functions for mutual
and proprietary companies, using data for 586 firms operating in the US life insurance
market during 1985-91. They found that proprietary and mutual companies do have
distinctive cost structures. The results also suggested that on average the mutual
companies were more X-efficient than the proprietary companies, although the evidence
indicated that the proprietary companies were more scale-efficient than the mutuals.
In more recent studies (see Adams and Hardwick, 1999 and Hardwick and
Adams, 1999), organisational form dummy variables were included in investigations into:
(a) the determination of the end-of-year ‘surplus’ reported by UK life insurance
companies, and (b) the use of financial derivatives by UK life insurance companies. The
results of the first study suggested that mutual companies on average report higher end-
of-year surpluses than proprietary companies (with similar premium income size,
leverage and output mix). The second study found that mutual companies have a greater
11
propensity to use derivatives (mainly as hedging instruments) than proprietary
companies. However, it was also found that, among those companies that did hold
derivatives, the proprietary companies on average had larger holdings than the mutual
companies.
Thus, existing evidence suggests that mutual life insurance companies are more
cost-efficient than proprietary life insurance companies. The evidence also supports the
view that mutuals tend to report higher end-of-year surpluses and are more inclined to
hold financial derivatives as part of their risk management activities. Does this mean that
mutuals in general perform better than proprietary companies?  In the next two sections,
we attempt to answer this question by examining a selection of performance indicators
for a sample of UK mutual and proprietary life insurers in the period 1995-6.
4.  Comparing the performance of mutual and proprietary life insurers
The data
To investigate the relative performance of mutual and proprietary life insurance
companies in the UK, data was collected for a sample of 20 mutual companies and 27
proprietary companies over the two years, 1995 and 1996, making 94 data points in all.
The accounting statistics used in the study were all collected from the Thesys database,
which summarises the returns made by all UK life insurers to the Department of Trade
and Industry. Data on organisational form were extracted from the Insurance Post Green
Book.
12
Company size and financial strength
The companies included in the sample varied greatly in size. The overall average
size of company was just under £7 billion in terms of assets and just over £630 million in
terms of premium income. As shown in Table 1, the mutual companies in the sample are
larger on average than the proprietary companies, though the mutuals have greater size
dispersion. In fact, the smallest company in the sample is a mutual (Cun  M with
assets of just over £3 million), while the largest company in the sample is proprietary (the
Prudential with assets of more than £42 billion). The free asset ratio (calculated by
Table 1   Comparing mutual and proprietary companies – size and financial
strength of the sample companies
Mutual companiesProprietary companies
Premium income size (£000)
Mean         676,906         597,227
Standard deviation        (920,087)        (759,132)
Asset size (£000)
Mean              8,080,786       6,190,298
Standard deviation      (10,221,307)      (8,445,656)
Free asset ratio (%)
Mean            16.5 12.3
Standard deviation           (12.5)  (8.9)
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expressing the value of free, or available, assets as a percentage of total admissable
assets) is also shown in Table 1. The free asset ratio may be used as a proxy for a
company’s ‘financial strength’, as free assets represent the amount of capital available
each year to finance new business, develop new products and purchase new technology,
etc. Surprisingly, the mutual companies in the sample in 1995-96 exhibited superior
financial strength, though the difference between the two mean free asset ratios is not
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level (t = 1.78).
Product mix
The companies in the sample all produce and sell life insurance policies and the
majority also produce and sell pensions and permanent health insurance policies. Most
companies also offer a mixture of ‘linked’ and ‘unlinked’ business.
To test for similar product mixes for mutual and proprietary companies, we first
calculated an index of diversification. To do this, each company’s premium income from
each of the three main lines of business (i.e. life insurance, pensions and permanent
health insurance) was expressed as a share (Sj) of total premium income. For each
company, the index of diversification (ID) was then calculated as:







This measure will vary between 1 for the most specialised company and 0.33 for the most
diversified. A priori one might expect that a proprietary company, with the aim of
maximising shareholder value, would be interested in offering a more limited range of
products in order to gain efficiencies in administration costs. Mutual companies, which
have a stated aim of providing ‘service to customers’, are likely to be interested in
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offering a wider range of products, possibly creating higher expense ratios. The results
are shown in Table 2 where the mutual companies are indeed found to be more
diversified, although the difference is not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
The proportion of linked to total new business (measured first in terms of premium
income and secondly in terms of the number of contracts) was also calculated. The results
show that proprietary companies produce significantly more linked business than
mutuals. In fact, in 1995-96, more than half of all new business (60 per cent of new
business premium income and 54 per cent of new contracts) was linked. For mutuals,
only about a quarter of new business was linked (29 per cent of new business premium
income and 24 per cent of new contracts).
End-of-year surplus and investment income
The surplus reported each year by life insurance companies is the actuarial
valuation of assets over long-term liabilities and represents the amount available for
paying bonuses to policyholders and/or reducing premiums. As shown in Table 3, the
average value of the surplus reported by the mutual companies in our sample was
significantly greater than that reported by the proprietary companies. More importantly,
the surplus to premium ratio was also higher, with the mean surplus equal to almost half
of premium income in the case of mutual companies, but less than a quarter in the case of
proprietary companies. This difference is highly significant at the 5 per cent level (t =
5.01).
Investment income is an important source of revenue for all life insurance
companies because the cash inflow from investments can be used, at least in part, to pay
15
Table 2   Comparing mutual and proprietary companies – product mix
Mutual companiesProprietary companies
Index of diversification
Mean           0.79             0.87
Standard deviation          (0.54)            (0.81)
Linked new business ratio (premiums)
Mean                0.29           0.60
Standard deviation         (0.30)                     (0.32)
Linked new business ratio (contracts)
Mean         0.24           0.54
Standard deviation         (0.26)          (0.32)
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Mean           252,519            160,240
Standard deviation          (319,220)            (314,675)
Surplus / premium ratio
Mean                    0.47               0.22
Standard deviation             (0.45)                        (0.22)
Table 4   Comparing mutual and proprietary companies – investment income
Mutual companiesProprietary companies
Investment income (£000)
Mean           422,581             289,328
Standard deviation          (580,040)            (388,425)
Investment income / premium ratio
Mean                    0.71               0.61
Standard deviation             (0.37)                        (0.42)
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for annual expenditures without resorting to the sale of underlying assets. As shown in
Table 4, the mutual companies in our sample outperformed the proprietary companies
during the period 1995-96 in this area too. Expressing investment income as a proportion
of premium income gives a ratio of 0.71 for mutuals, but only 0.61 for the proprietary
companies, though this difference is actually not significant at the 5 per cent level (t =
1.22).
Thus, if the end-of-year surplus and annual investment income can be regarded as
acceptable performance indicators, there is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest
that in 1995-96 mutual life insurers outperformed proprietary life insurers in these areas.
Expense ratios and the size-efficiency relationship
The comparison of expense ratios shown in Table 5 tends to favour the
proprietary companies in the sample. The expense ratios are calculated by expressing
total management expenses as a percentage of premium income. While the mutual
companies in the sample had a mean expense ratio of 26.5 per cent, the figure for the
proprietary companies was only 23.9 per cent, though this difference is not statistically
Table 5   Comparing mutual and proprietary companies – expense ratios
Mutual companiesProprietary companies
Expense ratio (%)
Mean           26.5             23.9
Standard deviation          (16.4)            (11.0)
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significant at the 5 per cent level (t = 0.87). Proprietary companies may have lower
expense ratios partly because of the greater corporate control exerted on managers by
shareholders, and partly because of their less diversified product structures.
To investigate the link between expenses and the premium income of life
insurance companies, the size-efficiency relationship was estimated separately for the
mutual and proprietary companies in the sample using regression analysis. To do this, the
natural logarithm of total management expenses (lnEXP) was regressed on the natural
logarithm of premium income (lnPREM) and the square of lnPREM, using ordinary least
squares. The regression results are shown in Table 6. The estimated equations fit the data
well and the results are remarkably similar for the two data sets, although a Chow test
does allow us (just) to reject the hypothesis that the two samples are taken from the same
population. In other words, we have some evidence that mutual and proprietary life
insurance companies have (slightly) different cost structures.
Using the regression estimates to calculate mean average cost for the two groups
confirmed that the proprietary companies had lower average costs than the mutuals (as
indicated by the expense ratios in Table 5). However, when we used the regression
residuals to estimate measures of cost efficiency, the mutual companies were found to be
more cost efficient than the proprietary companies. The term ‘cost efficiency’ in this
context refers to technical and allocative efficiency, rather than scale efficiency.
Consequently, the index of cost efficiency reported in Table 6 is based on the deviation of
each firm’s actual cost from the inimum cost for that size of firm, as indicated by the
estimated cost frontier. The cost efficiency of, say, firm 1 producing an output of y1 may
19
Table 6   Comparing mutual and proprietary companies – the size-efficiency
relationship
Mutual companies
lnEXP   =   -0.13   +   1.04 lnPREM   +   0.012 (lnPREM)2
      (-0.10)       (4.34)       (-1.1)
Adjusted R2  =  0.94
F statistic     =  315.9
Proprietary companies
lnEXP   =   -1.00   +   1.03 lnPREM   +   0.006 (lnPREM)2
       (-0.55)       (3.25)       (-0.44)
Adjusted R2  =  0.95
F statistic     =  488.1
Chow Test F  =  2.74  (Critical value = 2.72)
Mutual companiesProprietary companies
Index of cost efficiency (%)
Mean              66.8              62.4
Standard deviation             (30.3)             (23.1)
Fitted average cost
Mean                    0.26               0.22
Standard deviation             (0.14)                        (0.04)
Economies of scale
Mean                    0.75               0.88
Standard deviation             (0.05)                        (0.02)
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be calculated as 11ˆ CC , where 1ˆC  is the (fitted) minimum cost for a firm producing y1
and C1 is the actual cost for firm 1. The mutual companies in the sample were found to be
on average 66.8% cost efficient, while the proprietary companies were found to be only
62.4% cost efficient.
Lower average costs for proprietary companies together with greater cost
efficiency for mutual companies suggests that the proprietary companies were on average
more scale efficient. This is confirmed by the estimates of economies of scale reported in
Table 6. These results suggest that on average a 10 per cent rise in premium income
could be achieved with only a 7.5 per cent rise in expenses for mutual companies, but
with an 8.8 per cent rise in expenses for proprietary companies.
Fund performance
While we were unable to obtain figures to compare the performance of fund
managers in mutual and proprietary companies, we were able to examine the top
performers in a variety of categories, as ranked by Standard and Poor and published in
Money Management i  March 1999. The ‘top ten’ from these league tables are
reproduced in Table 7. In the ‘life fund’ tables, 32 separate companies occupy the top ten
places in the six categories. Of these, 14 are mutual companies and 18 are proprietary
companies, of which four are bancassurers. Thus, although only about a quarter of all life
offices are mutuals, 44 per cent of the 32 best-performing fund management teams are
mutuals. In the ‘pension fund’ tables, 10 out 35 best performers are mutuals. Clearly,
these league tables are not sufficient for us to conclude that mutual companies have better
21
Table 7   Comparing mutual and proprietary companies – fund managers’
league tables
LIFE FUNDS – TOP TEN
Smaller qualifying group
One year performance Five year performance Ten year performance
NFU Mutual Generali Generali
Abbey National Life Abbey National Life Reliance Mutual
Barclays Life NFU Mutual Scottish Widows
Royal London Royal London Royal Liver
Zurich Life Save and Prosper Zurich Life
Midland Life Barclays Life Save and Prosper
Scottish Friendly Family Assurance National Provident
Royal Liver Winterthur Life Merchant Investors
Hambro Assured Midland Life Midland Life
Save and Prosper Scottish Widows Scottish Amicable
Larger qualifying group
One year performance Five year performance Ten year performance
Friends Provident Royal and Sun Alliance Scottish Equitable
Guardian MGM Scottish Life
Eagle Star Scottish Equitable Clerical/Fidelity
Britannia Life Norwich Union AXA
Scottish Life Royal Scottish Royal and Sun Alliance
Lloyds TSB Clerical/Fidelity Merchant Investors
Royal Scottish Friends Provident Prudential
Clerical/Fidelity Guardian Standard Life
Royal and Sun Alliance AXA Equitable Life
CGU Legal and General Friends Provident
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PENSION FUNDS – TOP TEN
Smaller qualifying group
One year performance Five year performance Ten year performance
Abbey National Life Royal and Sun Alliance Royal and Sun Alliance
Barclays Life Generali London and Manchester
Swiss Life Abbey National Life NFU Mutual
NFU Mutual NFU Mutual Colonial Pensions
Alliance and Leicester Britannia Life Royal London
Royal London Medical Sickness National Mutual Life
Family Assurance Swiss Life Britannia Life
Lloyds TSB Barclays Life National Provident
Hambro Assured National Provident Allied Dunbar
National Mutual Royal London Generali
Larger qualifying group
One year performance Five year performance Ten year performance
Britannia Life Professional Life Legal and General
Royal and Sun Alliance MGM Abbey Life
Eagle Star Friends Provident Norwich Union
CGU London and ManchesterGartmore
National Provident Royal Scottish Friends Provident
Friends Provident AXA Skandia Linked
Royal Scottish Legal and Genral Merchant Investors
Norwich Union Norwich Union CGU
Fleming Life Mercury Merchant Investors Linked
Legal and General Standard Life Scottish Equitable
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fund managers than proprietary companies. But there is certainly no evidence that the
fund managers in mutuals under-perform.
5.  Conclusion
In the UK life insurance market, about a quarter of all companies are mutual. On
average, these mutual companies are of large size, but size is widely dispersed. In our
sample, the smallest mutual company had assets of only £3 million in the mid-1990s,
while the largest (Standard Life) had assets in excess of £40 billion. We have found that
the mutuals included in our sample performed well relative to proprietary companies in
terms of their overall financial strength, annual surpluses and investment earnings. While
the mutuals had slightly higher expense ratios than the proprietary companies, they were
relatively more cost efficient and operated with potential economies of scale. There is
also evidence that fund managers in mutuals perform at least as well on average as those
in proprietary companies. Overall, we have found no evidence to support the view that
agency problems adversely affect the performance of mutual life insurance companies in
the UK.
In fact, Murray (1999) has indicated that mutual life offices have a major potential
competitive edge over proprietary companies. They are “ideally positioned in that they
are owned by their members (i.e. policyholders), for the members, with all distributed
profits being shared among the members. It is a great message, but has never been
capitalised on.” Making a comparison with UK building societies, he points out that
“those societies which have stayed loyal to their mutual roots now push that message
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hard. . . . Imagine if some of the life offices could repeat the feat!”  Whether they are able
to “repeat the feat” or not, it would seem that mutual companies are likely to have a
successful future in the UK life insurance market.
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